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ABSTRACT
Control flow integrity (CFI) has received significant attention in
the community to combat control hijacking attacks in the presence
of memory corruption vulnerabilities. The challenges in creating a
practical CFI has resulted in the development of a new type of CFI
based on runtime type checking (RTC). RTC-based CFI has been
implemented in a number of recent practical efforts such as GRSe-
curity Reuse Attack Protector (RAP) and LLVM-CFI. While there
has been a number of previous efforts that studied the strengths
and limitations of other types of CFI techniques, little has been
done to evaluate the RTC-based CFI. In this work, we study the
effectiveness of RTC from the security and practicality aspects.
From the security perspective, we observe that type collisions are
abundant in sufficiently large code bases but exploiting them to
build a functional attack is not straightforward. Then we show how
an attacker can successfully bypass RTC techniques using a variant
of ROP attacks that respect type checking (called TROP) and also
built two proof-of-concept exploits, one against Nginx web server
and the other against Exim mail server. We also discuss practical
challenges of implementing RTC. Our findings suggest that while
RTC is more practical for applying CFI to large code bases, its policy
is not strong enough when facing a motivated attacker.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Memory corruption attacks continue to pose a major threat to
computer systems. Over the past decades, the sophistication of
such attacks has risen from simple code injection [28] to various
forms of code-reuse attacks (a.k.a. return-oriented programming –
ROP) [4, 8, 37, 38] as a result of the widespread adoption of defenses
such asW ⊕ X [29].
Preventing memory corruption attacks in legacy, memory unsafe
languages such as C/C++ is challenging. Complete memory safety
techniques that guarantee spatial and temporal pointer safety often
incur large runtime overhead [24, 25]. As a result, lighter-weight
defenses have been proposed that enforce weaker policies, but incur
lower performance overhead. One class of such defenses random-
izes or diversifies code at compile-time, load-time, or runtime [18]
to create non-determinism for an attacker. However, code random-
ization and diversification techniques are shown to be vulnerable
to various forms of direct [40], indirect [11], and side-channel [36]
information leakage attacks. Even leakage-resilient variants of such
defenses are shown to be vulnerable to code inference [39] and
indirect profiling attacks [33].
A class of memory defenses that aims to provide a balance be-
tween security and performance is Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [6].
CFI aims to prevent control hijacking memory corruption attacks
by checking the control flow transfers at runtime. While the policy
enforced by CFI does not prevent non-control hijacking attacks
(e.g., data-only attacks [17]), the relatively low overhead incurred
by CFI and its resilience to information leakage attacks make it one
of the desirable classes of defenses. CFI has even been called “one of
the most promising ways to stop advanced code-reuse attacks” [49].
One of the distinguishing factors among various CFI techniques
is how the control flow graph (CFG) is generated. Three major
classes of CFI defenses are: 1) those that generate the CFG statically
using points-to analysis [1, 2, 5, 26, 50], 2) those that generate the
CFG dynamically at runtime [13, 27, 30], and 3) those that generate
the CFG based on type information [21, 23, 44, 46, 49]. We call the
third class Runtime Type Checking (RTC)-based CFI (or simply
RTC in the rest of this paper). Since points-to analysis is often very
imprecise, difficult to modularize, and hard when only the binary is
available, many recent CFI techniques are designed based on RTC
[21, 23, 44, 46, 49].
In RTC, for forward edge protection, the type of function pointer
and the target are checked at each forward edge control transfer. A
weaker subclass of RTC techniques only checks the arity (argument
count) of forward edge transfers, and not the precise type [47, 49].
For backward edge protection (i.e., return address protection), the
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type of callee is checked during the function epilogue. RAP [46],
TypeArmor [49], Kernel CFI (KCFI) [23], MCFI [44], IFCC [47], and
LLVM-CFI [21] are some of the examples of RTC techniques. While
extensive work has been done on the effectiveness of CFI based on
points-to analysis (e.g., [7, 12, 14, 16, 20]), the strength of RTC has
not been studied.
To the best of our knowledge, three implementations of RTC are
available that protect both forward and backward edges with type
checking: KCFI [23], RAP [46], and MCFI [44]. Other approaches
such as IFCC [47], LLVM-CFI [21], and TypeArmor [49] only protect
the forward edge. While an implementation of KCFI is not available,
an open source version of RAP and LLVM-CFI are available. RAP
and LLVM-CFI also provide themost stable implementations of RTC
as they are targeting production environments, and are not research
prototypes (RAP has even been applied to the Linux distribution,
Subgraph OS [41]). In addition, RAP provides a more accurate CFG
than LLVM-CFI because it removes static functions from the target
set, unlike LLVM-CFI. Furthermore, neither RAP nor LLVM-CFI
limit the target set to address-taken functions. For these reasons,
we focus our analysis on RAP in this paper. In addition, we focus
only on C programs because RAP C++ is not free1.
In this paper, we provide the first study on the security and
practicality of RTC. From the security perspective, we illustrate that
type collisions exist, and are, in fact, very common in sufficiently
large applications. While, at first glance, it may appear that such
collisions should be straightforward to exploit (similar to attacks
that leverage the imprecisions in points-to analysis-based CFI), we
show that practical exploits against RTC face a major challenge: it
is unlikely that a corruptible pointer has the exact collision with a
desirable function for an attack (e.g., a system call). Indeed, we show
that while collisions are abundant, collisions with sensitive targets
such as system calls are, in fact, rare. We use a layered invocation
method against RTC inwhich a sensitive function is called indirectly
through multiple layers of other calls that eventually end in a call
that has a collision with a corruptible function pointer. In other
words, a sensitive function is called from a corruptible pointer
through various layers of other functions. We call the sensitive
function, the function that collides with a corruptible pointer, and
the other layers Execution-Gadget (E-gadget), Collision-Gadget
(C-gadget), and Linker-Gadget (L-gadget), respectively. Since
this form of ROP attack respects the type checking (thus bypassing
RTC), we call it Typed ROP (TROP) .
In order to illustrate the practicality of TROP, we build two
proof-of-concept exploits, one against Nginx and the other against
Exim, that successfully hijack control in the presence of RTC. Our
exploits successfully bypass the open-source version of RAP [46].
Furthermore, we perform an analysis of exploitable conditions in
many popular applications and servers. Our findings indicate that
collisions are abundantly found in real-world applications, and that
the gadgets necessary for a TROP attack (i.e., C-gadget, L-gadget,
and E-gadget) are prevalent in popular servers. Our results suggest
that, while RTC techniques complicate successful attacks and are,
in many cases, more practical than points-to analysis-based CFI,
1We tried to obtain the commercial version of RAP, but unfortunately were not able
to do so because, based on our exchanges with the staff at GRSecurity, procuring the
commercial version actually requires contracting GRSecurity’s security service, and is
not as simple as purchasing a software package for a fee.
on their own, they are not sufficient to prevent control hijacking in
the face of motivated attackers.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We provide a first in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of
RTC techniques.
• We illustrate a code reuse attack, TROP, that can successfully
bypass precise RTC even in the absence of collisions with
sensitive functions.
• We build two proof-of-concept exploits against Nginx and
Exim to show the practicality of TROP.
• We analyzemany popular applications and servers, and show
that the conditions necessary for a successful attack are
abundantly found in the real-world.
• We discuss the practical challenges of adopting RTC tech-
niques in large programs.
2 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM
DEFINITION
Lack of memory management in unsafe programming languages,
such as C/C++, has been introducing significant threats since 1988
when the first Internet worm exploited a buffer overflow vulnera-
bility in Fingerd [35]. As a result, there has been a continuous arms
race between the development of attacks and defenses.
Defenses in the memory corruption domain can be broadly cat-
egorized into enforcement-based and randomization-based tech-
niques. While randomization-based techniques [18] are vulnerable
to various forms of information leakage (e.g., [4, 36, 40]) attacks,
enforcement-based techniques [1, 24, 25] are resilient to such at-
tacks. Full memory safety techniques that enforce spatial [25] and
temporal [24] safety on pointers are examples of enforcement-based
defenses. Lighter-weight defenses in the enforcement-based cate-
gory impose more relaxed policies on code execution at runtime,
but provide better performance. Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [6] is
an example of such a defense that has received significant attention
in the community over the past years, and has even been deployed
in real-world systems [31, 45].
2.1 Control Flow Integrity (CFI)
CFI checks the indirect control transfers at runtime to prevent
control hijacking attacks [6]. It checks forward-edges (e.g., indirect
jumps and calls) and/or backward-edges (e.g., function returns) to
prevent the corruption of indirect control transfers via memory
bugs. While this policy is weaker than full memory safety (for
example, it does not prevent data-only attacks [17]), CFI aims to
prevent the most pernicious types of memory corruption attacks at
a relatively low performance cost.
CFI techniques can be categorized into three broad classes based
on how they generate their control flow graph (CFG). Perhaps
the most widely studied class of CFI is points-to analysis-based
CFI as it was originally proposed by Abadi et al. [1]. In this tech-
nique, the CFG is constructed statically using points-to analy-
sis [1, 2, 5, 26, 50]. Another class of CFI techniques construct their
CFG dynamically [13, 27, 30]. Dynamic CFIs need additional compu-
tations to identify and add new edges to the CFG during execution.
In this paper, we do not study them.
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The effectiveness of points-to analysis-based CFI crucially de-
pends on the ability to construct an accurate CFG. However, a
sound and precise CFG is hard to construct in the general case
due to the undecidability of points-to analysis [19, 32]. Coarse-
grained points-to analysis-based CFI techniques [53, 54] tackle this
problem by grouping many branch targets together; however, such
over-approximation is shown to be too relaxed to prevent control hi-
jacking attacks [12, 16]. Even fine-grained points-to analysis-based
CFI techniques are shown to be too permissive to prevent all forms
of control hijacking attacks, either because of the imprecisions of
static analysis [14], or because of the versatility of functions like
printf() [7]. These challenges along with the practical difficulties
of generating and handling CFGs in a modular way (e.g., dynamic
loading) have motivated the development of a third class of CFI
based on Runtime Type Checking (RTC).
2.2 Runtime Type Checking
RTC matches the type signature of each indirect control transfer
with its target. For forward-edge protection, RTC checks the type
signature of a function pointer and its target prior to each indirect
control transfer. For backward-edge protection, the type signature
of the callee is stored before the call site. Then this signature is
checked during the epilogue of the callee to make sure that such
a type signature exists in the call site. In other words, RTC lim-
its the control flow of a program to respect the type signatures.
It, thus, implements a form of CFI that relies on types. The type
matching can be enforced using label-based annotations, in which
labels are ‘hashes’ of function signatures. What constitutes the type
signature requires careful considerations, and is further discussed
in Section 2.4.
2.3 Arity Checking
Arity refers to the number of arguments of a function. Arity check-
ing is a strictly weaker form of RTC, in which only the number of
arguments of call sites and target functions are matched. In other
words, arity checking is a form of RTC in which only one type exists
for the argument. Hence, at runtime only the number of arguments
are compared. Arity checking has been implemented both at the
source code (IFCC) [47] and binary levels (TypeArmor) [49]. IFCC
assigns each function to a set based on its number of arguments,
and only allows indirect calls to the set with the correct number of
arguments. TypeArmor, in addition to the number of arguments,
considers the return type as well. TypeArmor has been shown to
prevent advanced code reuse attacks such as COOP [34].
2.4 Reuse Attack Protector (RAP)
RAP is a code-reuse attack protection that implements RTC. Figure 1
shows an example of type parts for a function pointer and a function
that are used in RAP. In this case, which shows a function and a
function pointer, the return type (void) and the argument types
(int and long) are parts of the type signature, while the names
are not. RAP generates two hashes for each function. One of them
is used when the function is the target of a function pointer. The
other one is used during backward-edge checking.
RAP calculates a hash for each function pointer and instruments
the call site, as shown in the line 4 of Figure 2. This line compares
Typedef void (*fptr) (  int    ,  long    )
void foo (  int   i,  long   j)
 
func rap_hash: 5d769299 
fptr rap_hash: 5d769299
Return type Parameter type RAP output
Figure 1: Type parts in RAP.
1 dq 0x11223344
2 func:
3 ...
4 cmpq $0x11223344 ,-8(%rax)
5 jne .error
6 call *%rax
Figure 2: Forward-edge checking in RAP.
1 jmp label
2 dq 0xffffffffaabbccdd
3 label:
4 call func
5
6 func()
7 .
8 .
9 mov %(rsp),%rcx
10 cmpq $0xaabbccdd ,2(% rcx)
11 jne .error
12 retn
Figure 3: Backward-edge checking in RAP.
the expected hash with the function’s type hash that is located
before the actual function’s memory address. If the hashes do not
match, the execution jumps to an error; otherwise, the indirect call
is taken as shown in line 6. Similarly, for backward-edges, the hash
value that is located before the call site and the one in epilogue are
compared and if they match, the program continues to return as
shown in Figure 3. Previous researches have shown that backward-
edge protection without enough sensitivity leads to the flexibility
to return to different call sites [7, 16]. To address this issue, RAP
encrypts the return address with a key which is stored in a register.
This technique makes a context sensitive version of RAP. However,
this feature is not available in open source version of RAP. Note
that RTC without a shadow stack or an equivalent technique such
as encrypted return address is vulnerable to backward-edge attacks
that have been studied comprehensively by other researchers [7, 16].
Hence, for the rest of this paper, we only focus on forward-edges.
2.5 Type Collisions
An astute reader might suspect that type collisions should exist in
sufficiently large code bases. This is indeed correct; however, we
show that type collisions do not immediately indicate the feasibility
of a practical attack against RTC. To clarify and explain, let us start
with an example.
Figure 4 shows a sample source code with intentional vulnera-
bilities in lines 36 and 37 for leaking and overwriting. This code
is compiled by the RAP plugin that protects the code with RTC.
Figure 5 shows its CFG. Although type collisions exist in this code
(between invalid_target() and corruptible_fptr), according to RTC,
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1 typedef void (* FunctionPointer)(void);
2
3 int flag = 0;
4 char *cmd;
5
6 void valid_target1(void){
7 printf("Valid Target 1\n");
8 }
9
10 void valid_target2(void){
11 printf("Valid Target 2\n");
12 }
13
14 int final_target(char *cmd){
15 system(cmd);
16 }
17
18 int linker_func(void){
19 if (flag ==1)
20 final_target(cmd);
21 }
22
23 void invalid_target(void){
24 linker_func ();
25 }
26
27 void vulnerable(char * input){
28 FunctionPointer corruptible_fptr;
29 char buf [20];
30
31 if (strcmp(input , "1") == 0)
32 corruptible_fptr = &valid_target1;
33 else
34 corruptible_fptr = &valid_target2;
35
36 printf(input);
37 strcpy(buf , input);
38
39 corruptible_fptr ();
40 }
Figure 4: A sample vulnerable program.
it is not allowable to call functions such as linker_func() or final_
target() (which may be interesting targets for an attacker because
of their ability to spawn a malicious shell) with the corruptible_fptr
function pointer. Such a call is prohibited because the type of the
functions and the corruptible_fptr function pointer are different.
As a result, while many type collisions might exist in large code
bases, their usefulness for a practical attack is questionable. There
may not exist any sensitive target that has type collision with a cor-
ruptible function pointer. Indeed in our analysis of real-world code
bases, we rarely found a package in which a sensitive function (e.g.,
a system call) collides with a corruptible function pointer. Thus,
the questions regarding the effectiveness of RTC are not trivial to
answer.
However, we make an observation in this sample source code
that provides an insight into how an attack can be built. We ob-
serve that while the sensitive functions cannot directly be called
by the corruptible_fptr function pointer, it is still possible to invoke
these functions through other functions. In this case, the invalid_
target() function has the same type as the corruptible_fptr function
pointer, so it is feasible to call this function, and as it can be seen,
there is a path from this function to the final_target() function. At
least in theory, it looks like that it should be feasible to reach the
final_target() function indirectly from the corruptible_fptr function
pointer. To do so; however, one must consider the constraints in
the execution path such as the if condition in line 19. In this case,
...
Figure 5: Control flow graph of the sample vulnerable pro-
gram. This figure illustrates how type collision leads to over-
approximation.
the constraint is satisfiable because the if condition checks a global
variable which can be overwritten by the attacker.
2.6 Research Questions
The above example and the observations made about possible col-
lisions and indirect invocations of sensitive functions raise the
following research questions:
• Can RTC be practically bypassed using type collisions?
• Are there enough intermediate functions with satisfiable
constraints in real-world applications that allow an attacker
to hijack control to a sensitive function (e.g., system calls) in
the presence of RTC?
• How prevalent are these constructs in real-world applica-
tions?
In the rest of the paper, we provide answers to these questions
in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the RTC from the secu-
rity perspective in Sections 3, 4, and 5. We discuss the practicality
considerations in Section 6.
3 ATTACK OVERVIEW
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the RTC, we show how an
attacker can exploit type collisions to build real attacks. Although
RTC significantly reduces the number of valid targets, we show that
the scope and prevalence of collisions make it possible to attack
many real-world applications.
3.1 Threat Model
Our threat model is inline with the larger body of literature in the
area of memory corruption. Since data execution prevention (a.k.a.
DEP or W ⊕ X) and address space layout randomization (ASLR) are
widely deployed in modern operating systems, we assume that they
are enabled on the target. Moreover, we assume that RAP is also
deployed on the target. Any control hijacking attempt that violates
type checking is properly detected and stopped. Moreover, since we
are interested in studying the effectiveness of the RTC paradigm as
a whole, and not the quality of any particular implementation, we
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consider implementation bugs or flaws out-of-scope for our attacks.
In other word, we do not target any implementation weakness.
On the attacker side, we assume the target application contains
one strong or multiple limited memory corruption vulnerabilities
that allow an attacker to write arbitrary values to arbitrary memory
locations including stack and heap and also leak some information
by arbitrary read primitive. A strong vulnerability similar to CVE-
2017-7184 (exploited in Pwn2Own 2017), CVE-2017-0143 (exploited
in WannaCry), CVE-2016-4117, or CVE-2015-0057 simultaneously
provides arbitrary read and write primitives, and can be exploited
multiple times to overwrite multiple values in memory [15]. A
more limited set of vulnerabilities can alternatively be used to
first read memory, and then write to it maliciously. For instance,
array out-of-bound access (CVE-2018-5008), non-terminated strings
(CVE-2017-7790) and format string can be used for arbitrary read
primitive. Other vulnerabilities such as double free (CVE-2018-
4990), type confusion (CVE-2015-1641) and format string can be
used for arbitrary write primitive. The long history of memory
corruption vulnerabilities has demonstrated that assuming their
existence even in the most tested code bases (e.g., Linux kernel
and Windows Services) is a reasonable and often valid proposition.
The assumptions in this work are thus realistic and inline with the
defenses [3, 9, 10, 22, 49] and attacks [4, 11, 33, 34, 38] presented in
the literature.
3.2 Attack Preliminaries
In order to perform a successful Typed ROP (TROP) attack against
RTC, an adversary needs to follow some steps to execute an arbi-
trary code. First, during the offline preparation phase, the attacker
searches for an interesting function that allows arbitrary execution,
for example execve() or any other function that has an equivalent
behavior. To do so, the arguments of an intended function must be
controllable by the attacker. For example, if the arguments reside
on heap or global memory, they can be overwritten at anytime by
an attacker. Next, the attacker needs to change a function pointer to
hijack control. It is imperative to note that the type of the function
pointer and the function should be the same; otherwise, RTC will
prevent the control transfer. This is what distinguishes a TROP at-
tack from a traditional ROP attack; i.e., a TROP attack is a special
form of ROP in which the hijacked control respects the type check-
ing.
Although this attack looks powerful in that it allows arbitrary
code execution, as mentioned earlier, it is very unlikely to find
such a type collision in real-world applications. This is due to the
fact that the attacker needs to have access to a corruptible pointer
that has the same type as the sensitive function of interest for
hijacking (in this case execve()). In order to address this challenge,
we use a technique based on layered invocations and type collisions,
which gives the attacker the opportunity to call functions even with
differing types from a corruptible function pointer. In a nutshell,
a target function of interest (i.e., a sensitive function) is invoked
indirectly through other intermediary functions in such a way that:
1) the first invoked function has the same type signature as the
corrupted function pointer, 2) each function in the chain contains
a valid invocation of the next function in its code, and 3) the last
function in the chain is the target function of interest.
To facilitate the description and analysis of TROP, we introduce
three types of gadgets that make it possible. We call the first func-
tion that has a type collision with a corruptible function pointer a
Collision gadget (C-gadget), the target function that the attacker
intends to invoke maliciously an Execution gadget (E-gadget),
and the intermediary functions that are called in a nested fashion
(from the collision gadget to the execution gadget) Linker gadgets
(L-gadget).
Figure 6 illustrates the high-level view of the location of the
gadgets. Each node is a representation of a gadget. The attacker
first corrupts a function pointer to redirect control to the C-gadget,
which, by definition, respects the type checking. The C-gadget
then calls other L-gadgets that, in turn, eventually call the E-
gadget.
3.3 Finding Gadgets
In this section, we describe the method to find and chain proper
gadgets to perform a TROP attack. In our terminology, we define the
whole function as a gadget. Finding gadgets starts with a corruptible
function pointer. For example, any function pointer on the stack or
heap adjacent to an overflow-able buffer (e.g., CVE-2016-9679), or
those that have known or leakable addresses (e.g., CVE-2017-7219)
are potential targets for corruption. The ideal scenario is to point
this pointer to the final target, but due to RTC, this is not possible
in most cases, so instead, the control is transferred to a C-gadget.
Any function that has the same type signature as the corruptible
function pointer is a candidate for a C-gadget. The next step is to
find an appropriate E-gadget. For E-gadget, we chose to focus
on functions that spawn a shell (e.g., execve system call or their
wrappers) since that provides an attacker with a wide range of
malicious capabilities sought after in the payloads. However, an
attacker may choose more limited functions (e.g., one that disables
DEP) if those are sufficient for the ultimate purpose of the attack.
After selecting the C-gadget and E-gadget, we need to find proper
L-gadgets to chain them together. With the help of the program’s
call graph, both direct and indirect calls, L-gadgets can be found
by traversing all the candidate paths starting from a C-gadget and
ending in an E-gadget.
We have developed a semi-automated tool that receives as input
the set of all C-gadgets and E-gadgets as well as the program’s
call graph, and finds all candidate L-gadgets in a given code base.
The tool uses RAP’s output during compilation which is in verbose
mode. The call sites and target sets are identifiable in this output.
The simplified algorithm inside our tool for finding all candidate
paths is listed in Algorithm 1. In the algorithm:
(1) G is the adjacencymatrix of the program’s direct and indirect
call graph
(2) N is the set of all nodes (functions) in the graph
(3) CG is the set of all C-gadgets
(4) EG is the set of all E-gadgets
(5) CP is the set of all candidate paths
(6) cд is the C-gadget
(7) eд is the E-gadget
(8) V is the set of already visited nodes (functions) in the graph
in order to prevent loops through recursive path discovery
algorithm (DiscoverPaths)
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(9) P is an ordered list of functions in the call chain
Algorithm 1 Finding candidate paths.
function FindCandidatePaths(G, N , CG, EG )
CP ← ∅
for cд ∈ CG do
for eд ∈ EG do
DiscoverPaths(CP, cд, eд, ∅, ∅)
end for
end for
return CP
end function
function DiscoverPaths(CP, cд, eд, P, V )
P ← P ∪ {cд }, V ← V ∪ {cд }
if cд == eд then
CP ← CP ∪ {P }
else
for д ∈ N do
if д < V and G[cд][д] = 1 then
DiscoverPaths(CP, д, eд, P, V )
end if
end for
end if
P ← P − {cд }, V ← V − {cд }
end function
As it can be seen in Algorithm 1, the FindCandidatePaths
function iterates over all C-gadgets and E-gadgets, and by using
DiscoverPaths, it finds all the possible paths (candidate paths)
between every combination of C-gadget and E-gadget. Finding
proper L-gadgets is more challenging though. We define an ideal
L-gadget as one that satisfies these conditions:
(1) The constraints inside the gadgets are controllable from
outside of it. For example, the constraints are based on global
variables that could be maliciously modified from outside of
the gadget.
(2) There is no constraint inside of the L-gadgets that affects
the flow to the E-gadget.
As it can be seen in Figure 6, there might be multiple paths from
a C-gadget to an E-gadget. Some paths are useful while others
are not. Empty nodes depict L-gadgets that do not have at least
one of the two attributes mentioned above, so they are eliminated.
The shaded nodes depict good candidates to reach the target. There
are also some cases where there is a pointer that can be used to
switch between different paths (in this example, nodes 1 and 2).
This provides more flexibility to the attacker.
We also note that it is possible to create a loop using these
gadgets. Creating a loop gives the opportunity to the attacker to
trigger a vulnerability multiple times. This is depicted in Figure 6
by edge #3.
3.4 Constraint Solving
As we consider the whole function as a gadget, there might be
some conditions in L-gadgets which influence the control flow of
the program. If an L-gadget contains a condition that prevents
reaching the intended E-gadget, then it needs to be resolved. For
instance, if there is an if condition in the L-gadget that returns
from the function, and halts the flow to the invocation point of
…
Call (*fptr)
….
Potential Linker gadgets
Execution gadget
Collision gadget
12
Legitimate target
3
loop Indirect callDirect call Good candidate gadgetBad candidate gadget
Figure 6: The location of gadgets in the CFG of the program.
Due to the type mismatching, the fptr is not able to point to
the execution gadget directly; hence it utilizes over approxi-
mation edge.
the E-gadget, or if there is a null data structure that is needed to
be filled with proper data before the L-gadget can be executed,
additional constraints need to be satisfied. Therefore, the list of
constraints between a C-gadget and an E-gadget is every point
in the program that changes the flow between these two nodes. To
see if the constraints before that point are satisfiable, the following
conditions should be in place:
(1) The constraint can be solved by overwriting data in memory.
(2) The data should be also accessible globally in memory out-
side the function.
The first condition ensures that the constraint can actually be
controlled by a malicious memory overwrite, while the second
condition ensures that the window of opportunity for overwriting
memory is not too short. For example, while local variables may be-
come corruptible during limited windows of time, their sometimes
short longevity makes them inappropriate targets for constraint
solving. In the last step, to get the concrete values for the con-
straints, depending on the number of constraints and complexity of
them, either manual solving or symbolic execution are applicable.
For our PoC exploits, we solved the constraints manually.
4 PROOF-OF-CONCEPT EXPLOITS
As a proof-of-concept, we show how the Nginx web server and the
Exim mail server protected by RTC can be exploited by TROP at-
tacks. In both cases, we manage to achieve arbitrary execution
while the server is protected by open source version of RAP. We
show how an attacker is able to redirect control to a function that
calls a function from the exec family. This enables us to execute
arbitrary commands via the spawned shell, which is a powerful
attack. To do so, we compiled Nginx-1.10.1 and Exim-4.89 with the
RAP GCC plugin. As we assumed in our threat model that we have
arbitrary read and write access to the memory, gdb is used to mimic
these primitives.
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Figure 7: The flow of the exploit in Nginx and the corre-
sponding gadgets.
4.1 Nginx Exploit
In the best case scenario, an attacker needs at least two types of
gadgets, C-gadget and E-gadget. However, our analysis of Nginx
using our tool indicates that there is no direct collision between
a potentially corruptible function pointer and a sensitive function
(e.g., a system call). We thus need to find enough L-gadgets to
link corruptible function pointers with a sensitive function such
as execve(). Searching through Nginx’s code using the algorithms
described in the previous section, we can indeed find enough L-
gadgets with satisfiable constraints.
The overview of our Nginx attack is illustrated in Figure 7. The
attack starts by corrupting the exit_process function pointer. Both
the exit_process function pointer and the ngx_master_process_cycle()
function have the same type signature, as it can be seen in Figure 8.
Therefore, ngx_master_process_cycle() function can be used as our
C-gadget. Due to the matching type signatures, such a malicious
redirection is not detected by RTC. Even though ngx_conf_flush_
files() function is the the valid target of the exit_process function
pointer, due to the type collision, we can change it to point to the
ngx_master_process_cycle() function instead. Our analysis indicates
that the ngx_execute_proc() function, which calls execve() directly,
can be a great candidate for our E-gadget, so we use it in our
attack. Figure 9 shows that the parameters of the execve() function
are also controllable in a global data structure. Now that we have
our C-gadget and E-gadget, we have to chain them with enough
L-gadgets. Our analysis based on the call graph of Nginx indicates
that two good candidates for L-gadgets are the ngx_reap_children()
and the ngx_spawn_process() functions. Figure 10 shows there is
the proc function pointer in our L-gadget which provides more
flexibility for the attacker to change the flow.
Constraint Solving. There are some constraints in our C-gadget
and L-gadgets that should be solved. For example, there is an
if condition in the ngx_master_process_cycle() function on ngx_
reap variable that might prevent execution from reaching ngx_
reap_children(). Moreover, there are multiple if conditions in the
ngx_reap_children() function, our first L-gadget, that have to be
satisfied to call the ngx_spawn_process() function, our second L-
gadget. Our second L-gadget (ngx_spawn_process) always calls
our E-gadget without any interruption, so in this case, there is no
constraint to be satisfied.
1 // Type definition of exit_process pointer
2 void (* exit_process)(ngx_cycle_t *cycle)
3 // Type definition of ngx_master_process_cycle
4 void ngx_master_process_cycle(ngx_cycle_t *cycle)
5
6 void ngx_master_process_cycle(ngx_cycle_t *cycle) {
7 ...
8 // This function helps to create a loop. It
calls (* exit_process) in the following
9 ngx_start_worker_processes(cycle ,
ccf ->worker_processes , NGX_PROCESS_RESPAWN);
10 ...
11 // By setting this condition to true , the
attacker can reach to the next gadget which
is ngx_reap_children ()
12 if (ngx_reap) {
13 ngx_reap = 0;
14 ngx_log_debug0(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_EVENT ,
cycle ->log , 0, "reap children");
15 live = ngx_reap_children(cycle);}
Figure 8: ngx_master_process_cycle is a C-gadget
1 ngx_execute_proc(ngx_cycle_t *cycle , void *data)
2 {
3 ngx_exec_ctx_t *ctx = data;
4 if (execve(ctx ->path , ctx ->argv , ctx ->envp) ==
-1) {
5 ngx_log_error(
6 NGX_LOG_ALERT ,
7 cycle ->log ,
8 ngx_errno ,
9 "execve () failed while executing %s
\"%s\"",
10 ctx ->name , ctx ->path);
11 }
12 exit (1);
13 }
Figure 9: ngx_execute_proc is an E-gadget. The parameters
of execve function are controllable globally.
In order to satisfy the constraints listed above, we observe that
they are all controllable by overwriting global variables or heap ob-
jects. Consequently, in our exploit, we first use our arbitrary write
vulnerability to set the value of ngx_reap that resides in global mem-
ory to 1. This allows our C-gadget (ngx_master_process_cycle()) to
call our first L-gadget (ngx_reap_children()). We then use the same
vulnerability to write the desired values to ngx_processes[i].respawn,
ngx_processes[i].exiting, ngx_terminate, and ngx_quit on the heap
that allows our first L-gadget (ngx_reap_children()) to call our
second L-gadget. Then we overwrite the function pointer (exit_
process) to point to our C-gadget. After this overwrite, the execu-
tion passes from C-gadget to the L-gadgets to the E-gadget, at
which point a malicious shell is spawned under our control.
4.2 Exim Exploit
For the sake of brevity and due to its similarity to Nginx exploit,
we skip the details of the steps necessary to build Exim exploit. We
find that Exim’s source code is indeed large enough that it contains
proper gadgets, and a large number of corruptible memory read
and write operations. A previous example of such a corruption
happened with CVE-2016-9963 that allowed a remote attacker to
read the private DKIM signing key, and write it to a log file. In our
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1 ngx_spawn_process(
2 ngx_cycle_t *cycle ,
3 ngx_spawn_proc_pt proc ,
4 void *data ,
5 char *name ,
6 ngx_int_t respawn) {
7 ...
8 proc(cycle , data); // The proc function pointer
invokes ngx_execute_proc function in this
case
9 }
Figure 10: ngx_spawn_process is an L-gadget
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Figure 11: The flow of the exploit in Exim and the corre-
sponding gadgets.
exploit, we again focus on spawning a malicious shell because of
its generality and strength as a remote attack.
Like our Nginx exploit, we use our gadget finder tool to find the
proper gadgets and paths in the program that can be used to reach
an E-gadget, in Exim’s case, the child_open_uid() function. We
maliciously overwrite the receive_feof function pointer inside the re-
ceive_msg() function and redirect execution to the smtp_setup_msg()
function, which serves as our C-gadget. The functions acl_check(),
acl_check_internal(), expand_string(), expand_string_internal, and
child_open() serve as our L-gadgets with easily satisfiable con-
straints. Note that while the chain of gadgets is much longer in
the case of Exim, the exploit is indeed simpler because there are
fewer constraints in the L-gadgets. The flow of the exploit and the
position of gadgets are shown in Figure 11. In order to bypass some
constraints of the L-gadgets, we used ${run{/bin/bash}}$\\ as
the payload. This complex payload helps us execute the shell com-
mand and solve the constraints.
4.3 Summary
These two exploits indicate that although RTC does complicate a
successful exploit and places a number of limitations on how such
an exploit can be built, motivated attackers may still find feasible
and realistic opportunities to build damaging TROP attacks using
type collisions.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the prevalence of collisions and gadgets
necessary for launching a TROP attack. For our evaluation, we
chose the top 10 C packages in the Ubuntu repository [48] as well
as three widely used web servers (Httpd, Nginx, and Lighttpd)
and a mail server (Exim). The list of the applications are shown
in Table 1. For each of these applications, we compiled it with the
RAP GCC plugin. We then used our gadget finder tool that parses
the RAP’s output and generates a JSON file containing the function
pointers as well as their call sites in the program. In addition, our
tool extracts the target functions for each of these call sites. In all
of our evaluation, the default modules of the analyzed applications
were used. In addition, the open source version of RAPwas deployed
with default options and compilation flags.
5.1 Type Collisions
In order to establish a baseline for the accuracy of type signatures,
we have to distinguish valid and invalid targets. Because of the im-
precision of points-to analysis, no automated analysis can perform
sound and precise determination of valid and invalid targets, so we
first manually analyze the JSON output and label targets as valid
or invalid using careful inspection of the source code. This estab-
lishes the baseline to which we can compare RAP’s type signatures.
Note that the manual labeling is not because of the limitations in
the analysis of this effort; rather, it is a fundamental limitation of
points-to analysis. Because no automated analysis can establish
sound and precise points-to analysis, comparing RAP’s targets with
any other automated analysis would be meaningless; there would
be no basis to believe one as the ground truth. Moreover, if such
a precise automated analysis existed, points-to analysis-based CFI
could have been implemented precisely. However, we know that
points-to analysis is imprecise, and in fact, the imprecisions have
been shown in the previous work [14]. That is why we manually
label targets. The rest of our analysis is automated.
Table 1 illustrates the statistics for the analyzed applications,
among which the number of function pointer signatures defined
by the program and the number of all locations from which these
function pointers are being called (call sites). For example, observe
that applications such as httpd, heavily use function pointers due
to their modular design.
Furthermore, we extract all functions defined in the programs,
as well as the functions for which RAP generates a type signature
(hash). Interestingly, RAP generates no hash for 34.6% of the func-
tions, on average, across all programs. One reason is the fact that
RAP does not generate a hash for static functions which cannot
be invoked by external callers and are not called indirectly locally.
Our analysis indicates that a large fraction of functions are not
called indirectly. Specifically, only 15.2% of functions are also valid
targets on average across all programs. In other words, about 50.2%
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Figure 12: Increase in the number of targets and edges when linked with glibc.
Table 1: Over-approximantion of target functions and indirect calls because of type collisions.
App Version FunctionPointer
Call
Sites Functions
Functions
w/ Hash
Function Targets Indirect Calls
All Invalid All Invalid
base-passwd 3.5.39 6 6 45 45 (100.0%) 0 0 (0.0%) 0 0 (0.0%)
coreutils 8.2 42 80 1,789 682 (38.1%) 116 43 (37.1%) 416 110 (26.4%)
e2fsprogs 1.42.13 97 264 1,964 1,243 (63.3%) 251 176 (70.1%) 1,383 400 (28.9%)
exim 4.89 43 93 968 607 (62.7%) 88 121 (137.5%) 359 165 (46.0%)
findutils 4.6.0 28 52 821 554 (67.5%) 200 89 (44.5%) 326 65 (19.9%)
grep 2.25 19 28 460 264 (57.4%) 38 19 (50.0%) 113 52 (46.0%)
httpd 2.4.25 248 546 2,800 2,338 (83.5%) 1,332 483 (36.3%) 3,915 794 (20.3%)
lighttpd 1.4.45 27 108 899 524 (58.3%) 228 40 (17.5%) 830 221 (26.6%)
ncurses 6.0 46 77 1,835 1,045 (56.9%) 156 273 (175.0%) 969 397 (41.0%)
nginx 1.10.1 84 290 1,299 977 (75.2%) 610 319 (52.3%) 5,977 3,512 (58.8%)
sed 4.2.2 1 1 213 140 (65.7%) 2 0 (0.0%) 2 0 (0.0%)
tar 1.28 46 86 1,166 730 (62.6%) 141 166 (117.7%) 1,008 754 (74.8%)
util-linux 2.27.1 53 75 3,143 1,681 (53.5%) 211 177 (83.9%) 1,060 643 (60.7%)
zlib 1.2.8 5 14 152 108 (71.1%) 5 0 (0.0%) 13 0 (0.0%)
of functions on average have a hash generated for them, while they
are not called indirectly at all. This, consequently, increases the
hash collisions and creates further opportunities for an attacker
to call these functions using irrelevant function pointers with the
same signature. As mentioned before, it is not uncommon for prac-
tical implementations to include non-address taken functions into
the target sets. We observed this behavior in both RAP and LLVM-
CFI implementations.
The important factor for estimating the impact of type collision
is determining the number of functions that are not valid targets of
function pointers but can be indirectly called through one of the
function pointers in the program. The eighth and tenth columns
of Table 1 show the number of invalid target functions and invalid
indirect calls possible in the program because of type collisions.
These numbers underline the scope of the weakness created by
type collisions. In Nginx alone, for example, 3,512 function pointers
can invalidly point to 319 functions which are never intended to
be indirect targets just because they happen to share the same
type signature. Note that in applications that rarely use function
pointers, such as base-passwd and sed, the number of possible
Table 2: Gadget distributions.
App Version C-gadget L-gadget E-gadget
nginx 1.10.1 8 6 1
httpd 2.4.25 40 19 5
lighttpd 1.4.45 8 29 6
exim 4.90 16 32 7
corruptible indirect calls because of type collision is zero, but these
applications are the exceptions rather than the rule. In our analysis,
any application that contains more than tens of function pointers
present abundant opportunities for function pointer corruptions
that respect the RTC.
5.2 Gadget Distribution
Now that we know type collisions can result in numerous oppor-
tunities for control redirection, we shift our focus to counting the
gadgets necessary for an exploit. We use the algorithms described
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in Section 3. Table 2 shows the number of gadgets in four popular
web and mail servers. Any combination of these gadgets could be a
new invocation chain as described in section 3.3 and 3.4. However,
more inter-procedural analysis might be needed to determine con-
trollable L-gadgets. For these results, we limited our analysis only
to the programs themselves and not the linked libraries because this
provides a more accurate result, and avoids double counting gad-
gets in overlapping sets of linked libraries. Moreover, as described
earlier, the E-gadgets can be many different targets depending on
the exact goal of the payload (e.g., modifying target configurations,
disabling W ⊕ X, running a shell script, etc.). For this analysis, we
chose a general, yet powerful type of E-gadgets, namely those
that allow arbitrary execution via spawning a malicious shell (e.g.,
exec family or system). We also chose C-gadgets based on the path
to the E-gadgets from the list of invalid function targets.
As can be observed from the table, there are many gadgets avail-
able in these applications. In fact, Nginx has the lowest number of
gadgets among the four servers analyzed, but as demonstrated, we
could successfully hijack its control and launch a malicious shell.
In our exploit, we used four gadgets from the 15 available in Nginx.
Linked libraries provide numerous other opportunities for mali-
cious control hijacking in the face of RTC. For the sake of simplicity
and accuracy, our gadget counts in Table 2 do not include the gad-
gets from linked libraries, but for the sake of completeness, we now
evaluate the impact of linked libraries, primarily the ubiquitous
library in Linux applications and servers, Libc.
5.3 Libc
For complete protection, the linked libraries must also be protected
with RTC. However, counter-intuitively, here we show that protect-
ing linked libraries with RTC significantly increases the number of
opportunities for the attacker.
To evaluate the impact of linked libraries, we compile the ap-
plications listed in Table 1 this time with glibc2, and recount the
number of invalid indirect targets and invalid edges (indirect calls),
introduced by the additional collisions. Figure 12a shows the num-
ber of targets in the analyzed applications with and without glibc.
We observe that linking glibc significantly increases the number
of targets that have collisions with the function pointers in the
applications, thus magnifying the opportunities for an attack. The
new collisions open new paths for attackers to transfer control
from the function pointers in the application to the functions inside
glibc while respecting RTC. For example, in coreutil, there are
297 new target functions to which the execution can be transferred,
and in grep, 291 target functions are added to the existing gadgets.
More important than potential targets, however, are the addi-
tional edges. Figure 12b illustrates the additional edges (indirect
calls) allowed in the applications as a result of collisions introduced
by glibc. We observe that the number of the new edges is much
higher than the number of new target functions in glibc. This
is because different function pointers can call all of the colliding
target functions, thus growing the number of possible edges multi-
plicatively.
2https://www.gnu.org/s/libc/
Table 3: Invalid indirect calls added to programs because of
type collisions and imprecise points-to analysis.
App Base Type Checking Points-to Analysis
Total Invalid Total Invalid
base-passwd 0 0 0 (0.0%) 0 0 (0.0%)
coreutils 213 291 78 (26.8%) 308 198 (64.3%)
e2fsprogs 557 861 304 (35.3%) 42 15 (35.7%)
exim 107 212 105 (49.5%) 169 99 (58.6%)
findutils 237 279 42 (15.1%) 448 231 (51.6%)
grep 54 105 51 (48.6%) 108 60 (55.6%)
httpd 2,126 2,870 744 (25.9%) - -
lighttpd 327 442 115 (26.0%) 1,096 938 (85.6%)
ncurses 291 558 267 (47.8%) 507 238 (46.9%)
nginx 1,276 2,287 1,011 (44.2%) - -
sed 2 2 0 (0.0%) 2 0 (0.0%)
tar 208 664 456 (68.7%) 360 167 (46.4%)
util-linux 311 943 632 (67.0%) 596 465 (78.0%)
zlib 10 10 0 (0.0%) 10 4 (40.0%)
5.4 Type Checking vs. Points-to Analysis
Previous attacks such as Control Jujutsu [14] describe the impor-
tance of precise CFG. Even though our focus is evaluating RTC-
based CFI variants, we posit that it can be useful to compare the
over-approximation in RTC with points-to analysis-based CFI. Re-
call that the over-approximation in points-to analysis-based CFI is
because of imprecise points-to analysis, while in RTC-based CFI, it
is because of type collisions.
In order to compare the two, we calculate the number of invalid
edges allowed because of their imprecisions. As a baseline for points-
to analysis-based CFI, we use SVF [42, 52], which is the state-of-
the-art in flow sensitive points-to analysis. We again used manual
labeling and source code inspection to identify valid and invalid
edges. Table 3 shows the number of total and invalid edges in both
type checking and points-to analysis. The base column shows the
ground truth (manual labels). The results provide no clear advantage
for one or the other approach in terms of the number of targets. In
4 of the 14 programs, RTC is less accurate than points-to analysis,
while in 8 of them, it is the opposite. However, we observe that flow
sensitive points-to analysis is not always possible. For example, for
Nginx and Httpd, SVF was not able to finish the analysis process,
and in fact crashed after 5 hours (showed by a dash in the table). On
the other hand, RTC can be applied in large code bases more easily.
This experiment suggests that RTC is a more practical solution
which offers almost the same security guarantees for large real-
world programs.
6 DISCUSSION
There are further practical challenges of implementing RTC for
real-world applications. For the sake of completeness, we review
them briefly in this section.
6.1 Type Diversification
As it was shown in our study, the main source of problem in RTC
is type collision. RAP proposes a type diversification technique in
order to generate unique types. Diversification of colliding types,
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1 typedef ngx_int_t (* ngx_output_chain_filter_pt)
2 (void *ctx , ngx_chain_t *in);
3
4 static ngx_int_t ngx_http_charset_body_filter
5 (ngx_http_request_t *r, ngx_chain_t *in)
Figure 13: Type mismatch between the ngx_output_chain_
filter_pt function pointer and its target ngx_http_charset_
body_filter.
in such a way that each function pointer only shares type signa-
ture with its true target would reduce the type collision problem.
By this technique, the attacker will not be able to find C-gadget
and therefore the attacks like TROP could be mitigated from the
beginning. However, such a diversification, unlike generic RTC,
requires a precise points-to analysis to establish the exact target
of each function pointer. As discussed earlier, precise points-to
analysis is shown to be hard, and the imprecisions are shown to be
exploitable [14]. In other words, type diversification re-introduces
the challenge faced by points-to analysis-based CFI, namely the
imprecision of points-to analysis, to RTC.
6.2 Separate Compilation
Large code bases are often compiled in separate compilation units
at different times. This allows easier collaboration and debugging
in large projects. However, separate compilation further compli-
cates type diversification. Since not all source files are available
during each compilation step, the colliding types to diversify are not
known to RTC. If each compilation unit is diversified independent
of the other units, false positives will be introduced and execution
will halt whenever function pointer from a compilation unit be-
nignly calls a function in a different compilation unit (because their
diversified types are very likely different). Consequently, proper
type diversification in the presence of separate compilation units
requires additional meta data and tracking mechanisms to avoid
breaking functionality.
6.3 Mismatch types
The main assumption in RTC is that the types of caller and callee
are the same. However, this assumption is not always true. For
example in real-world applications there are cases that some part
of the function pointers are void* and these function pointers are
able to point to any other pointer types such as int* and long*.
According to RTC, this is a mismatch. However, in fact, this feature
makes the programs more flexible. Figure 13 shows an example
of this type mismatch between the function pointer with its valid
function target in Nginx.
In order to address this challenge, there are two possible ap-
proaches. The first approach is to cast all the void* to the proper
types in order to prevent any mismatch. This approach, used by
RAP, requires large modifications in the source code, which makes
it time-consuming. The second approach is to generalize void* to
other types and allow matching of void* to any pointer type. Al-
though this method does not require source code modifications,
it makes the RTC more relaxed and creates more opportunity for
attacks.
6.4 Support for Assembly Code
In many low-level libraries, there are portions of the code that are
written in in-line assembly. Prominently, glibc implements system
calls in assembly. Automated annotation of assembly with type
information is hard. A permissive policy for assembly code could
create additional exploitation opportunities, while a restrictive one
crashes benign applications. Further work is necessary in this area
to safely handle assembly code.
7 RELATEDWORK
The related work in the area of memory attacks and defenses is vast.
For broader treatment of the related work, we refer the reader to sur-
veys and systematization of knowledge papers in this area [6, 18, 43].
Here we limit our discussions to closely related efforts. Control
Jujutsu attack [14] bypasses points-to analysis-based CFI using the
additional edges introduced to a CFG because of the imprecision
of points-to analysis. Control Jujutsu further demonstrates that
certain coding practices such as recursions and modular design
exacerbate the imprecision of context-sensitive and flow-sensitive
points-to analysis. Control-Flow Bending [7] also attacks CFI. It
assumes a fully-precise CFG, but uses versatile functions such as
printf() as its mechanism. Our attack is not reliant on any spe-
cific function like that. Furthermore, a CFB attack is prevented by
the modern Fortify Source option in libc that stops “%n” for-
mat string attacks [51]. Counterfeit Object Oriented-Programming
(COOP) [34] is another attack on CFI. COOP exclusively relies on
C++ virtual functions for its exploitation technique.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we evaluated the effectiveness of CFI techniques based
on Runtime Type Checking (RTC). We examined RTC from security
and practicality perspectives. We showed that while direct type
collisions between corruptible forward edges and target functions
are rare, type collisions with other functions can be exploited in a
nested fashion to implement an attack (TROP). We further evalu-
ated the prevalence of opportunities for such attacks and showed
that both the type collisions and the gadgets necessary for TROP
attacks are abundantly found in many real-world applications. We
also compared the imprecisions of RTC and points-to analysis tech-
niques and found that their strength is heavily dependent on the
code base. Our findings indicate that, while RTC is a practical de-
fense that can complicate exploitation, on its own, it is not sufficient
to prevent control-hijacking memory corruption attacks.
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